While consumer behavior and policy researchers have contributed to legislation and legal decisions for reference price advertising, there is hardly any research on how "other" external price information may impact the effects of reference prices and associated semantic cues. These issues are studied with two 3 x 2 x 2 experiments. Results of the first study indicate that consumer evaluations are influenced by "other" external price information within a plausible reference price range. In addition, presence of "other" external price information resulted in more positive perceptions of the offer when respondents were exposed to an abstract semantic cue. However, the results of the second study show that "other" external price information had no effect when the respondents were exposed to implausible or highly implausible prices, but the reference price level affected consumers' perceptions of value, attitude toward the deal, and search intentions. The possible public policy and managerial implications are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Retail price promotion represents a major component of the marketing strategy for retail firms, with firms spending around $5 billion annually to advertise some form of price promotion (Friedmann and Haynes 1990) . These advertisements often include some type of price comparison or reference price claim. The use of advertisements containing comparative or reference price claims has led to considerable interest from marketing scholars, practitioners, and public policy formulators alike in the theoretical and practical implications of such claims (Compeau, Grewal, and Grewal 1994) . Recently, in an integrative of the literature, Compeau and Grewal (1998) have called for additional research in the area of comparative price advertising.
A central concern of comparative or reference price promotion is its potential for being deceptive. While research has shown that consumers tend to discount advertised price claims, many studies indicate that comparative price claims, including implausible or exaggerated reference price claims, still influence consumers' perceptions of value and behavioral intentions (Biswas and Blair 1991; Grewal, Marmorstein, and Sharma 1996; Licata, Biswas, and Krishnan 1998; Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989; Lichtenstein, Burton, and Karson 1991; Urbany, Bearden, and Weilbaker 1988) . These findings suggest that consumers may erroneously infer the product/brand being advertised in such reference price ads as a better "deal" than those not framed within a reference price context or in the context of plausible reference prices, thus generating public policy concerns (Liefeld and Heslop 1985) . The deceptive potential of advertised reference prices has prompted Compeau and Grewal (1998, p.264) to suggest that "federal enforcement efforts should be stepped up to complement the states' efforts" in prosecuting retailers who make false savings claims.
However, before imposing draconian controls or assigning resources towards enforcement of FTC regulations, effects might be reassessed to identify if there are specific market conditions that mitigate the impact of deceptive advertised reference prices. Closer examination of prior reference pricing studies reveals that respondents were provided with only one external reference price, namely the regular price or a competitor's price. In practice, however, consumers seldom are limited to using only one externally provided reference point or price. In fact, as pointed out by Kahneman (1992) , consumers often use multiple reference points. In evaluating comparative price claims, consumers may be exposed to and use information containing multiple reference points from a variety of sources. One source of additional price information is advertisements of comparable products from competitor firms.
Assessing reference price effects, both plausible and implausible, in the presence of this "other" price information is important, as it is likely that consumers will be exposed to such information concurrently. Specifically, if consumers use this "other" price information in forming judgments of value and determining behavioral intention, then the consumer may be protected somewhat from potentially deceptive reference price practices. However, if the consumer does not utilize this "other" price information then there remains the potential for deceptiveness of reference prices. In this context, it is important to understand if the use of this "other" price information moderates the influence of the reference price claim. If implausible reference price claims result in judgments of enhanced value without consumers' consideration of this "other" price information, then public policy makers should be concerned about the potential deceptive effects of such implausible reference price claims.
Another factor that may influence the consumers' use of additional price information is the type of semantic cue used to express the savings (Berkowitz and Walton 1980; Grewal, Marmorstein, and Sharma 1996; Lichtenstein, Burton, and Karson 1991) . Semantic cues may be seen as either concrete or abstract. More abstract semantic cues such as such as "A $199 Value, Sale Price $119" provide less precise information about the discount and may potentially mislead consumers by implying that the store normally sells the product at $199. Consequently, consumers may be more likely to question the validity of such claims and seek confirmatory information in the form of additional "other" price information.
In this paper we study both the effect of reference price claims and semantic cue type in a more ecologically valid setting by providing respondents with additional external price information in the form of competitor advertisements. Specifically, we conduct two studies to examine the effects of merchant supplied reference prices and abstract versus concrete semantic cues in the presence of price information from sources other than the advertising merchant. In the first study, the merchant supplied reference price is restricted to the plausible range. An objective of the first study is to determine if consumers are likely to use this "other" price information when plausible reference price claims are present in advertisements. In the second study we examine the effects of "other" price information for implausible and highly implausible reference price claims. The two studies enable us to better understand the association between externally available "other" price information and traditional reference price effects found in previous studies in both the plausible and implausible ranges.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we detail the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) guidelines regarding deceptive pricing. Next, we present the theories commonly applied to reference price study and propose hypotheses about how information on "other" brand's price may interact with reference prices and semantic cues. In the following sections, the methodologies and results for two studies are presented. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the managerial and public policy implications and limitations of our study along with areas of future research.
FTC GUIDELINES AGAINST DECEPTIVE PRICING
Section 233 of FTC guidelines for advertising is concerned with deceptive pricing. There are five sub-sections ranging from 233.1 to 233.5. These guidelines deal with (a) former price comparisons, (b) retail price comparisons (with competitors), (c) price comparisons with those suggested by manufacturers, (d) bargains based on purchase of other merchandise, and (e) miscellaneous price comparisons. Among these five sections of the guidelines against deceptive pricing, the first three deal directly with reference prices and semantic cues and are briefly described below (A more detailed analysis of the FTC guidelines can be found in Grewal and Compeau 1992) .
Former Price Comparisons:
Retailers frequently use advertisements such as "Formerly sold at $10, Now Only $7.50." In an effort to protect the consumer, the retailer is required to have either sold a reasonable number of units at the price mentioned in the ad ($10) or at least make sure that the product was on offer at that price for a substantially long period. The FTC has mandated this so that retailers do not advertise bargains from fictitious prices at which the product was never sold.
Retail Price Comparisons:
Another form of advertising which is popular among retailers is to compare the offer price with that of a competitor. Advertisements such as "Retail Value $10.00, Our Price $7.50" are commonly used. The FTC mandates that such comparative advertising is legal only if the price that the offer is being compared to (in this case $10.00), is a prevailing price at a similar store in the same market. It is also important to note that $10.00 must be the prevailing price for a product of the same quality and grade. This guideline is to prevent the advertiser from making outrageous claims and comparisons.
Advertised Retail Prices Suggested by Manufacturers: Advertisements such as "Suggested Retail Price $10, Our Price $7.50" are common. Though a suggested retail price is typically the price at which the product ought to be sold, it has been observed that the practice of retail discounts has led to much confusion in the market place. Hence, FTC's guideline states that for a retailer to suggest that he is offering a bargain compared to the manufacturer's suggested list price, the product must be sold at that price in the retailer's market. Unless a substantial number of units of the product are sold at the suggested list price, the retailer may not use the above form of advertising.
In sum, the FTC may consider reference prices in ads to be deceptive if: (1) there is representation or omission likely to mislead consumers, (2) consumers are viewed as acting reasonably in the circumstances, and (3) the representation / omission is material in that it is likely to affect the consumer's conduct or decision with regard to the promoted product (FTC Policy Statement on Deception 1983). Calfee (1997, pp.13-14) notes that few fictitious pricing cases have been initiated by the FTC in recent years because some policy-makers believe that litigation brought against pricecutting firms during the 1950's and 1960's may have worked against the best interests of consumers. Also, in most instances, the advertised sale price may be viewed as a search quality of a product that is easily verified by the consumer upon product inspection (cf. Ippolito 1986; Nelson 1970 Nelson , 1974 Posner 1973 ). However, it should be noted that reference prices used in ads, where the advertiser communicates information about a price of an ambiguous competitor or a formerly charged price (see categories (a) and (b) discussed above), may be very difficult to verify easily.
While the FTC has the authority to question potentially deceptive price promotion in advertising, deceptive pricing practices also may be questioned in accord with various state consumer protection statutes. Attorney Generals of several states have used such statutes to file complaints against and penalize merchants for their use of potentially misleading advertised prices. For example, in 1989 the Colorado Attorney General filed a complaint against May D&F, the operator of twelve department stores in Colorado, for setting fictitious "regular" and "original" prices solely for offering subsequent discounts in its "Home Store" department. The court ruling indicated that parts of May D&F's pricing policy were deceptive (Compeau, Grewal and Grewal 1994; Kaufmann, Smith and Ortmeyer 1994 department stores under the banners of "The Bay", "Zellers", "Kmart", and "Fields" is Canada's largest department store retailer. A fine of $600,000 was imposed by the Ontario Court (General Division), the second highest ever imposed for a conviction of a misleading advertising offense under the Competition Act.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
From a theoretical perspective, adaptation level theory and assimilation contrast theory have been used in explaining the effects of reference prices as well as semantic cues used in reference price advertisements. These two theories are discussed and the hypotheses tested in the first study are developed in this section.
Adaptation Level Theory
As applied to price perception research, adaptation level theory (Helson 1964) suggests that consumers have a range of internal reference prices against which advertised external prices are judged. The internal price range represents the primary organic cue and is affected by two other classes of cues, focal and contextual (Gotlieb and Dubinsky 1991; Monroe 1990; Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989) . Focal cues are the major focus of the consumers' attention and include the promoted price and product information in retail ads. Contextual cues include background information in the ad and other secondary stimuli to which the individual is not directly attending. According to various pricing studies (Biswas and Blair 1991; Urbany, Bearden and Weilbaker 1988) , contextual cues in an ad may affect how the focal cue is judged relative to the internal reference price range that is retrieved from memory for the product/brand. The major implication derived from the adaptation level theory is that consumers perceive that there is a range of acceptable prices for any given product and any external price information which falls within this range is not likely to change or shift the consumer's internal reference price range (Biswas and Blair 1991; Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989; Lichtenstein, Burton, and Karson 1991; Urbany, Bearden and Weilbaker 1988) .
Assimilation Contrast Theory
Assimilation contrast theory (Sherif and Hovland 1961) has been used in conjunction with the adaptation level theory to explain how external reference prices may influence consumers' internal reference prices and subsequent purchase evaluations. Assimilation contrast theory suggests that consumers have a latitude of acceptance around their price beliefs that influences their reaction to an external reference price (Biswas 1992; Monroe 1990; Lichtenstein, Burton and Karson 1991) . The major implication of this theory is that external reference prices can be either assimilated into or contrasted against the consumer's internal reference price range.
Thus, the internal reference price of a consumer, and, consequently, the range of acceptable prices is likely to shift in accordance with information acquired via external sources such as reference price advertisements (Lichtenstein, Burton and Karson 1991; Monroe, Della Bitta and Downey 1977) .
The assimilation effects of plausible reference prices are well documented in the literature. As expected, most studies have found greater positive effects of high-plausible reference prices on consumers' value perceptions and deal evaluations compared with lowplausible or no reference prices. Consistent with past findings (and potential policy concerns), we predict that an ad using a high plausible reference price will have stronger effects than ads using a low plausible or no reference price.
H1: Exposure to a high-plausible reference price will result in higher (a) perceptions of value and (b) attitude towards the deal, and (c) lower search intentions, than exposure to low-plausible or no reference prices.
Reference Prices and Price Information for Similar Products. Consumers are often exposed to reference price ads from a retail merchant concurrently with price information for related and non-related products. While previous reference price studies have not examined the effects of such "other" price information, adaptation level theory suggests that this "other" information may interact with the reference price in affecting value judgements. Additionally, the theory of economics of information suggests that consumers are likely to maximize the utility of their purchase decision by searching for information as long as the marginal value of sanctions exceeds its marginal cost (Nelson 1974; Stigler 1961) . Consequently, consumers are likely to use readily available price information for similar brands to evaluate the target offer. Gotlieb and Dubinsky (1991) examined the effect of a rival product price on consumer responses to the price of a target product. The authors report that rival product prices can help explain the impact of target product prices. In particular, the authors found that an advertised price from a highly credible source had a greater effect on involvement and intentions when the rival product price was higher than the advertised price. While Gotlieb and Dubinsky (1991) studied the effects of rival price information on evaluation of only the offer price of the target product, this study examines the same effect in the context of comparative or reference price advertisements.
While the price information on related products may influence consumers' evaluation of reference price and the offer price for the main product, the exact process through which the evaluation occurs is unclear. One possibility is that price information on related products may influence consumers' internal price standards and, therefore, impact the evaluation of the deal for the main product. Alternatively, price information on related products may influence the value judgment of the target offer not by influencing internal reference prices, but rather by serving as an additional external standard of comparison.
Regardless of the specific nature of the evaluation process, when other brand's prices are above or at a level similar to the advertised reference price, these other prices serve to positively confirm the price discount and enhance value perceptions and deal attitude, suggesting a positive effect of these other prices. Also, because consumers can use this other price information to help evaluate the product's focal selling price, the influence of the reference price in the ad should be diminished. Based on this discussion, we posit that when other brand's prices are above or similar to a plausible reference price, this "other" price information should enhance consumer perceptions and deal attitudes and reduce search intentions (H2). In addition, within a plausible range of prices, information on "other" brand's price will influence consumers' evaluations of the deal for a target product such that reference price effects will be stronger when no other price information is available (H3). More specifically, reference price effects should be more positive for perceptions of value and attitude towards the deal, and more negative for search intentions, when there is no information available on other brand's prices.
H2: The availability of information on "other" brand's prices (that are close to or exceed a plausible reference price) has a positive effect on (a) perceptions of value and (b) attitude towards the deal, and a negative effect on (c) search intentions.
H3: Reference price effects are moderated by information on "other" brand's prices. The effect of a reference price on (a) perceptions of value, (b) attitude towards the deal, and (c) search intentions will be greater when there is no information available on other brand's prices than when other price information is available.
Effects of Semantic Cues
In a price promotion ad, consumers are exposed to the focal price information within the context of semantic cues. For example, in an advertisement which states "Was $350, Now only $299", the prices $350 and $299 are the focal cues, while the wording "Was ____, Now Only ___" is the semantic cue. The effects of semantic cues depend on the meaning ascribed to those cues by the consumer (Berkowitz and Walton 1980) . Some semantic cues used in comparative price advertisements are concrete in nature, whereas others are abstract.
Cue concreteness can be defined as the degree of detail and specificity about the price comparison being made. A cue such as "Regular Price/Sale Price" can be considered as concrete because it is very specific about the nature of the price comparison. The "Regular Price/Sale
Price" cue clearly indicates the product's customary price and the current offer price. It is quite likely that consumers feel confident about understanding the price implications of these words.
Comparatively, a cue such as "A ____ Value, Sale Price ____" is more abstract in nature and the price implications may be less well understood. Such a cue does not provide any information as to who is assessing the "value" or whether the value is a price that existed previously or not.
Consistent with this view, in a review of the literature Grewal and Compeau (1992) note different semantic cues are perceived at different levels of clarity and informativeness which in turn influences consumers' perceptions and behavioral responses.
Research by Ford, Smith, and Swasy (1990) found that consumers were more skeptical of subjective or abstract advertising claims. In the area of pricing, tensile price claims, which are by definition more abstract and ambiguous compared to specific discounts, were found to be less believable and less effective (Mobley, Bearden, and Teel 1988) . However, Biswas and Burton (1993, 1994) found that in some instances abstract discounts were as effective as specific discounts.
Thus, while consumers may be skeptical of cues such as "A ___ Value, Sale Price ___" it is not clear if consumer skepticism will necessarily render an abstract savings claim less effective than a concrete claim. As suggested by the anchoring and adjustment framework, it is not necessary for a cue to be more believable in order to be perceived as implying a higher value (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) . Thus, it is important to determine if and when such cues may lead to higher perceptions of value, despite the likelihood of being more ambiguous. According to the "hypothesis testing" theory, persuasion by advertising is a two step process. In the first step, the consumer encountering an ad is induced to entertain a hypothesis about the product or the offer from the claim made in the ad. The hypothesis is held tentatively in recognition of its "partisan" source. In the second step, consistent with information processing theories, evidence that bears on the hypothesis is searched for internally or externally. This evidence could come from previous experience in the form of memory, or it could come from external information that is perceived to be more impartial than the advertiser's claim. The "hypothesis testing" theory predicts that there will be an interaction between advertising and information such that the presence of confirmatory information will result in a stronger effect.
Semantic Cues and Price Information for
Therefore, based on consumers' desire for additional information when faced with ambiguous messages and the "hypothesis testing" theory (Deighton 1984; Hoch and Ha 1986) , information on "other" brand's price may have a greater influence for an abstract cue if the "other" brand's price confirms or positively disconfirms the reference information (i.e., similar to or greater than "A ____ Value"). Specifically, we hypothesize:
H4: Information on "other" brand's price and semantic cues for the "focal" brand will interact such that the effect of "other" brands price on (a) perceptions of value, (b) attitude towards the deal, and (c) search intentions will be greater for an abstract compared to a concrete semantic cue.
STUDY ONE -METHOD Study Design
The first study used a 3 (Reference Price Levels) × 2 (Cue Type) × 2 (Other Price Information Present or Absent) between subjects experimental design. Calculators were chosen for the advertised product because of past usage in reference pricing studies (e.g. Lichtenstein,
Burton, and Karson 1991) and the appropriateness of the product to our student sample. Of the 215 subjects, 94% reported ownership of calculators similar to those used in the study. The three reference price levels used in this study were (1) no reference price, (2) low plausible reference price, and (3) high plausible reference price. In the no reference price manipulation only the selling price of $59.95 was given. The low plausible reference price ($69.95) was set at about 17% higher than the selling price. For the high plausible reference price an amount approximately 34% higher than the selling price was utilized ($79.95). The selection of the selling price and the plausible reference price levels were determined through pretesting (which is described below).
"Other" price information was varied at two levels, present or absent. In the information present cells, the subjects were given external price information for two comparable calculators.
The additional price information was given in an accompanying advertisement and represented actual market level prices for the two calculators. The first calculator was priced at $73.87 and the second one at $79.95. These prices were either equal to or slightly below the high plausible reference price stated in the target ad. Additional product information provided for these other calculators was comparable to that of the focal ad except that no brand name was given in the accompanying advertisement. Semantic cues in the focal reference price ad were manipulated as concrete or abstract. For the concrete cue, claims were made representing the reference price as a previous selling price ("Was $___ / Now $___"). In the abstract cue situation, the reference price was given as an abstract value representation ("A $___ Value / Sale Price $___"). Selection of the appropriate semantic cues was made on the basis of our pretest results.
Sample and Procedure
Two hundred and fifteen undergraduate business students participated in the study. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of 12 groups and were almost equally divided between males (49.8%) and females (50.2%). Cell sizes for the 12 groups ranged from a low of 14 to a high of 20. Subjects received an experimental booklet which consisted of instructions on the first page, professionally produced advertisements on the next two pages, and a questionnaire with measures of the dependent variables of interest on subsequent pages. Twelve test advertisements were professionally created to correspond to the conditions of interest. The first ad in the booklet was the focal advertisement for a "Wall-Streeter" calculator (a fictitious name) with the reference price and semantic cue manipulations. The accompaniment advertisement containing the comparable calculators was provided to those subjects in the information present cells. Subjects in the information absent cells saw an American Cancer Society ad in place of the additional price information advertisement.
Operationalization of Dependent Variables
Perceived Value of the Deal. Perceived offer value was measured across the dimensions of perceived worth, price deal acceptability (price fairness), and value for the money using three seven-point scales (Berkowitz and Walton 1980) . Coefficient alpha for this measure was .74.
Attitude Towards the Deal. Measurement of this construct was accomplished using three seven-point scales with end points of favorable/unfavorable, bad/good, and poor/excellent (Lichtenstein, Burton, and Karson 1991 
Pretest Results
Pretests were conducted to select appropriate semantic cues and levels of external reference prices. To determine the external reference prices that would be perceived as plausibly high and plausibly low, relative to a constant offering price, 34 respondents (undergraduate business students) were shown an advertisement describing the treatment calculator along with a selling price of $59.95 (no external reference price was indicated). The $59.95 selling price was chosen because it represented the actual offering price of the calculator from which the test ad was obtained. The respondents were then asked to indicate the highest possible regular price for the calculator. The mean estimate was $81.95. This value was rounded down to a more commercially realistic value for a high plausible external reference price of $79.95. As previously mentioned, the low plausible reference price was set at approximately 17% higher than the offering price ($69.95).
The second part of the pretest was designed to select semantic cues that would be seen as concrete or abstract. Initially, ten semantic cues were included. These cues were selected from previous studies and a review of local advertising and appeared to communicate different levels of abstractness or concreteness. The selected cues were given to the 34 respondents who were asked to assess the concreteness and abstractness of each cue using a single seven-point scale anchored on either end by abstract (1) and concrete (7). The cue rated with the highest mean (5.12), "Was $____, Now Only $____", was selected as the concrete cue, while the cue with the lowest mean (3.76), "A $___ value, Sale Price $____", was selected as the abstract cue. A t-test demonstrated that the cues were seen as distinct in their abstractness/concreteness (t=3.86, df=32, p < . 001).
STUDY ONE -RESULTS

Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were included to determine that the type of semantic cue was attended to and properly interpreted by the respondents. Three 7-point agree-disagree scales (e.g., "I was provided with price information on calculators in an ad used in this study other than the Wall-Streeter calculator ad") were used to assess the external information manipulation.
Verification of the information manipulation entailed submitting the summated three item scale Two items were used to assess whether the subjects properly interpreted the semantic cue as abstract or concrete. After responding to all dependent variables, subjects were given both cues and were asked to rate each cue on seven-point scales anchored by "Ambiguous/Unambiguous" and "Abstract/Concrete". The two items were summed to form one value for abstractness/concreteness for each cue. A paired sample t-test indicated that the subjects in the study saw the two cues as intended, and as significantly different (t=8.00, p < .001) in their level of abstractness/concreteness.
Results of MANCOVA
Since the dependent variables of perceived value of the deal, attitude towards the deal, and search intentions were significantly correlated, (all p-values < .05), a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with univariate follow-ups and contrasts where appropriate, was performed to test hypotheses. As the perception of a source's credibility may impact subject's responses to the advertisements, source credibility was used as a covariate in the analysis (Gotlieb and Dubinsky 1991) . Multivariate and univariate results of the analyses may be seen in Table 1 along with the means for each experimental cell in Table 2 .
--------------------------------------Insert Tables 1 & 2 About Here --------------------------------------Results Pertaining to Reference Prices and "Other" Price Information. H1 and H2
concerned the main effects of reference price level and the provision of "other" price information, and H3 addressed the predicted interaction between these factors. As seen in Table   1 , the multivariate effects are significant for reference price (P) level (Wilks' Lambda = .91; F = 3.31; p < .01) and information (Wilks' Lambda = .95; F = 3.25; p < .05), as is the interaction effect between price and information (Wilks' Lambda = .93; F = 2.25; p < .05). The multivariate interaction is attributable to the dependent variables of perceived value of the deal (F = 5.14, p < .01) and attitude towards the deal (F =4.33, p < .05). For these dependent variables, effects are interpreted based on predictions in H1-H3. Figure 1 shows plots of the adjusted cell means for perceived value and attitude towards the deal for each reference price level and price information condition. The plots for both dependent variables demonstrate similar results. As predicted in H1 and consistent with the main effect of reference price, the high-plausible reference price results in higher perceived value and deal attitude overall, but effects appear dependent on whether or not "other" information is provided. Similarly, when other price information is provided, evaluations are more positive in general (consistent with H2), but these effects are influenced by reference price level.
--------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 About Here --------------------------------------
Consistent with H1 and findings of previous studies, when subjects were not exposed to "other" price information, one-way ANOVA's indicate significant reference price effects for value perceptions (F=4.09, p < .05) and attitude towards the deal (F=4.06, p < .05). Within this no "other" price information condition, contrasts comparing the no and low reference price conditions to the high reference price condition are significant both for perceived value (low vs.
high-plausible reference price: t = 2.82, p < .01; no vs. high-plausible reference price: t = 1.82, p < .05) and deal attitude (low vs. high-plausible reference price: t = 2.85, p < .01; no vs. highplausible reference price: t = 1.51, p < .10). However, in accord with H3 predictions, when other price information was available, one-way ANOVA's show no reference price effects for perceived value (F = .61, p > .20) or deal attitude (F = .64, p > .20), and contrasts show no differences between the high-plausible reference price and other reference price conditions. Interestingly, Figure 1 shows that in the high-plausible reference price condition, the presence of other price information results in evaluations very similar to the condition in which no other price was included. The significant main effects and pattern of the interaction for perceived value and attitude toward the deal provides considerable support for predictions in H1a,1b, H2a,2b, and H3a,3b.
For the search intentions dependent variable, there is a univariate main effect of "other" information (F = 5.03, p < .05) and reference price (F = 4.42, p < .05) and no significant interactions. Respondents indicated significantly lower search intentions (F = 5.03, p < .05) when exposed to other price information (mean = 16.08) compared to when they were not provided with such information (mean = 17.40), as predicted in H2c. In contrast to predictions in H1, search intentions are highest when consumers are exposed to high-plausible reference prices (mean = 17.98) and lowest for low-plausible reference prices (mean = 16.04). Thus, these reference price findings pertaining to search intentions do not offer support for predictions in H1c or H3c.
In addition to these hypothesized effects, the low-plausible reference price resulted in value perceptions similar to the no-reference price condition. This finding is consistent with the suggestion of previous studies (c.f. Blair and Landon 1981; Lichtenstein, Burton and Karson 1991 ) that for a reference price to have an effect, it has to be at least 20% above the offer price. Semantic Cues and "Other" Price Information. H4 predicts that information on "other" brand's price will have a greater effect when the semantic cue is abstract compared to when it is concrete. As seen in Table 1 , the MANCOVA results indicate a significant interaction between "other" price information (I) and cue type (C) (Wilks' Lambda = .94; F = 4.38; p < .01).
The multivariate interaction effect is attributable to univariate interactions for perceived value of the deal (F = 5.50, p < .05) and attitude towards the deal (F =9.72, p < .01).
The adjusted cell means for perceived value and attitude towards the deal, for each price information condition and the two types of cues (concrete and abstract), are presented in Figure   2 . The plots for both dependent variables demonstrate similar results. As predicted in H4, the effect of "other" price information was stronger for abstract cues. Subjects' perceived value was higher when they were exposed to an abstract cue and other price information (mean = 15.30) than when they were exposed an abstract cue without other price information (mean = 13.27).
However, there were no differences in perceived value between "other" information present (mean = 13.84) and absent (mean = 13.66) conditions when the cue was concrete. Similarly, attitude towards the deal was higher for the abstract cue and other price information condition (mean = 15.87) than for the abstract cue in the absence of other price information (mean = 12.86). When the semantic cue was concrete, the difference in deal attitude between "other" information present (mean = 12.82) and absent (mean = 13.00) conditions was not significant.
The predicted interaction was not evident for search intentions. Thus, the pattern of results provides support for H4 predictions for perceived value and attitude towards the deal but not for search.
--------------------------------------Insert Figure 2 About Here --------------------------------------
In sum, the findings of the first study indicate that within a plausible price range, consumers are likely to be influenced by "other" external price information in judging a comparative price offer. The "traditional" effects of high-plausible reference prices on perceptions of value and attitude towards the deal were evident only in the absence of "other" external price information. In the presence of "other" external price information there were no differences in perceived value or attitude towards the deal between the high reference price and the other reference price conditions. If such effects generalize to implausible reference prices, these effects of market price information have implications for public policy concerns.
STUDY TWO
While the assimilation effects of plausible reference prices are well documented, the price perception literature is unclear about the exact nature of the contrast and the outcome of an implausible reference price (Urbany, Bearden and Weilbaker 1988; Lichtenstein, Burton and Karson 1991) . The contrast effect would suggest that an external reference price greater than the highest expected normal market price will be completely rejected and result in a negative reaction towards the retailer's "deceptive" pricing practices. Alternatively, it has been suggested that consumers may discount the implausible or exaggerated reference price to an "acceptable" level and be affected to some degree by the discounted external reference price (Urbany, Bearden and Weilbaker 1988) . However, findings of several studies indicate that exaggerated reference prices can enhance consumers' value perceptions and deal evaluations more than highplausible reference prices (Biswas 1992; Biswas and Blair 1991; Burton, Lichtenstein, and Herr 1993; Lichtenstein, Burton and Karson 1991; Urbany, Bearden and Weilbaker 1988) . Given these results, there may be particular concern from policy makers regarding the possibility of deception due to the use of exaggerated reference prices.
In the second study we examine if the effects of "other" brand's price information are also evident for both implausible and highly implausible reference prices, as predicted by adaptation-level theory and economics of information. Specifically, if consumers use "other" price information as confirmatory evidence, then implausible prices may have little or no effect on their deal evaluations, suggesting that consumers may not be easily misled by reference prices when marketplace price information is available. Conversely, if positive effects are found for implausible prices even when consumers are exposed to price information for other products, one could make a strong case for the potential deceptiveness of such ads.
STUDY TWO -METHOD
Study Design
The second study was conducted to examine if the effects of other external price information found for plausible reference prices would be replicated for implausible and highly-implausible reference prices. This study also used a 3 (Reference Price Levels) X 2 (Cue Type) X 2 (Other Price Information Present or Absent). The three reference price levels used in this study were (1) high-plausible ($79.95), (2) implausible ($129.95), and (3) highly implausible ($249.95) . The three price levels were selected based on the results of the pretest described in the first study. The implausible price was set at $129.95 because only two out of 34 respondents mentioned a regular price of $129.00 or above for a calculator on sale for $59.95. The implausible reference price was approximately more than twice the sale price. The highly implausible reference price was more than four times higher than the sale price, and clearly above the estimates provided by the pretest respondents. The semantic cue and other price information manipulations and dependent measures used in study one were also used in this study. The reliabilities for perceived value of the deal, attitude towards the deal, and search intentions were .76, .94, and .88, respectively.
Sample and Procedure
A total of two hundred and eight undergraduate business students participated in the study. The total sample included 137 new respondents for the implausible and highly implausible conditions and 71 respondents from the high-plausible condition from the first study. The original data from the 71 subjects from the first study were used as controls in the second study with the objective of comparing the implausible price treatments with the high-plausible treatment. The subjects were almost equally divided between males (46.2%) and females (53.8%) and 97.1% reported ownership of calculators. The experimental procedure was exactly the same as in the first study.
RESULTS -STUDY TWO
Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were conducted to assess if the cues were perceived appropriately by the respondents. Three items were used to assess the "other" external price information manipulation (coefficient alpha = .91). A 3 (Reference Price Level) × 2 (Semantic Cue) × 2 (Information) ANOVA was conducted with the summed scale as the dependent variable. The ANOVA showed only a significant main effect (i.e., no interaction or other main effects) for information on the dependent variable (F=499.80, p < .001) with mean values as expected, indicating a successful manipulation.
Similar to the first study, the subjects were given the cues and were asked to rate each cue on seven-point scales anchored by "Ambiguous/Unambiguous" and "Abstract/Concrete." The two items were summed to form one value for abstractness/concreteness for each cue. A paired sample t-test indicated that the subjects in the study saw the two cues as intended, and as significantly different (t=5.40, p < .001) in their level of abstractness/concreteness.
Results of MANCOVA
A multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with appropriate contrasts was conducted. Source credibility was used as a covariate in the analysis. A summary of the results from the analysis may be seen in Table 3 . As seen in Table 3 , the multivariate effect of reference price level (P) is significant (Wilks' Lambda = .86; F = 4.84; p < .01). However, the multivariate main effect of other price information (I) (Wilks' Lambda = .95; F = .82; p > .1) and cue type (C) (Wilks' Lambda = .97; F = 1.87; p > .1) are not significant. The results in Table 3 also show no significant two or three-way interactions among the three factors. Hence, the discussion of the results of the second study will focus on the main effects of reference price level. Table 3 About Here
The multivariate main effect of the price level is attributable to the dependent variables of perceived value of the deal (F = 5.79, p < .01), attitude towards the deal (F = 3.40, p < .05), and search intentions (F = 11.23, p < .01). The means and univariate contrasts for all dependent variables for the three price levels are provided in Table 4 . As indicated in Table 4 , the highly implausible (t = 3.46, p < .01) reference prices results in significantly higher value perceptions than the high-plausible reference price condition. The differences in value perception between implausible and highly implausible reference prices and implausible and high-plausible reference prices are significant (t values = 1.67 and 1.78, respectively, p < .05 for one-tail tests). Table 4 About Here
For the dependent variable of attitude towards the deal, the highly implausible reference price results in significantly higher means compared to implausible (t = 2.17, p < .05) and highplausible reference prices (t = 2.53, p < .01). There is no difference in attitude towards the deal between implausible and high-plausible reference prices (t = .33, p > .1). Finally, as indicated in Table 4 , search intention is the lowest for highly implausible reference prices, and both implausible (t = -3.10, p < .01) and highly implausible (t = -4.47, p < .01) reference prices result in significantly lower search intentions than the high-plausible reference price. Based on the suggestion of a reviewer, we performed an ANCOVA using Perceived Value (PV) and Attitude Towards the Deal (ATTD) as covariates to determine if reference price still had an effect on search intentions after controlling for PV and ATTD. An ANCOVA with PV and ATTD as covariates resulted in a slight reduction in the F-value associated with the reference price effect, but the reference price factor remained significant (F=7.09, p < .001) Thus, the effect of reference price on search intentions in Study 2 remained significant even after controlling for PV and ATTD.
Stores Co. 1990 and North Carolina vs. J.C. Penny Co., Inc. 1989) involving retailers, as well as the attention the topic has generated from academic researchers (Blair and Landon 1981 , Biswas and Blair 1991 , Grewal et al., 1996 , Urbany et al., 1988 , Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989 .
Most academic research has found that implausible or exaggerated reference prices can have a positive effect on consumers' evaluations of a promotional offer. However, in almost all studies the effects of advertised reference price have been investigated in situations where consumers were exposed to only the target ad. What is not known is whether "other" price information in the environment can have any effects on consumers' judgment of a reference price ad. Also unknown is whether the effects of implausible prices found in previous studies would be evident when consumers are exposed to prices for similar products. If the positive effects are found for implausible prices even when consumers are exposed to price information for other products, it is likely to heighten the concerns of public policy formulators regarding the potential for such ads being deceptive.
In the first study, the "traditional" effects of reference prices were found in the absence of "other" external price information. That is, in partial support of H1, a high-plausible reference price resulted in higher value perceptions and attitude towards the deal than the low-plausible and no-reference price conditions. Within a plausible price range, however, consumers provided with "other" external price information are likely to use it to make judgments regarding the offer.
Overall, the presence of this other price information (which was set approximately at the highplausible reference price level) positively influenced consumer perceptions and reduced search intentions (H2 supported). In addition (and as predicted in H3), the effect of the reference price on consumer evaluations was stronger when there was no "other" price information available.
The presence of this "other" external price information resulted in similar perceptions of value and attitude towards the deal between the high-plausible reference price condition and other reference price conditions.
Interpreting the results from a different perspective, presence of "other" external price information resulted in higher perceptions of value and attitude towards the deal in the no-and low-reference price conditions. Probably, upon seeing a higher price for a similar product, consumers perceived the offer price as even more attractive than implied or intended by the advertiser's reference price. At the high-plausible reference price level, the effects were similar conditions. At high-plausible price level the "other" price information simply conveyed the same information as the advertised reference price. These findings suggest that consumers used "other" price information when exposed to plausible levels of reference price for the focal Wall-Streeter brand and that "other" price information may actually benefit the merchant in certain situations.
Results from the first study also indicated that an abstract cue had a more positive effect on consumers' value perceptions and attitude towards the deal when they were exposed to "other" external price information (H4 supported). This finding seems consistent with hypothesis testing rationale in which consumers are likely to seek confirmatory information either internally or externally for an advertising claim (Deighton 1984) . We believe that when consumers are faced with abstract information or cues such as "A $___ Value / Sale Price $ ___," they are more likely to question the veracity of the claim and seek out external confirmatory information than when viewing a concrete claim. When exposed to impartial external information (i.e., prices in a competitor's ad), the abstract claim may either be enhanced (when confirmed) or diminished (when disconfirmed) resulting in greater or lesser perceptions of offer value than without such information.
The second study revealed a very interesting finding and generates significant public policy concerns. Contrary to theoretical predictions of adaptation-level theory and the theory of economics of information, at implausible reference price levels there was only a main effect of reference price on the dependent variables. Neither type of cue nor the presence/absence of "other" price information had any effect on the variables of interest. Additionally, there were no interaction effects. Apparently respondents failed to utilize the "other" price information when exposed to the implausible reference price conditions. Both implausible and highly implausible prices resulted in significantly higher value perceptions compared to the high-plausible reference price condition. In addition, both implausible and highly implausible prices resulted in lower search intentions compared to the high-plausible reference price condition. For value of the deal the effect size for the reference price treatment increased from .02 in the first study to .06 in the second study. For search intentions the effect size increased from .04 to .11. The effect sizes for the other independent variables declined in the second study.
These effects of highly implausible reference prices may be explained by the anchoring and adjustment process (Burton, Lichtenstein, and Herr 1993; Hogarth 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1974) . In this process, an initial starting point, relevant or irrelevant is used as the anchor for a judgement or estimation of values of unknown objects. This anchor is then adjusted to reflect implications of other information provided by external sources such as the semantic or focal cues. However, the adjustments are generally insufficient and lead to estimates that are biased in the direction of the initial anchor (Slovic, Fiscoff, and Lichtenstein 1982) . Applied to reference pricing, the anchoring and adjustment framework suggests that the external reference price stated in an ad serves as an anchor from which consumers make cognitive adjustments in making value judgments. Adjustments to the internal reference price are normally biased toward the anchor point.
High anchor points may unduly influence consumer perceptions as predicted by the anchoring and adjustment framework and the effect may be present even for experts. For example, Northcraft and Neale (1987) examined the effects that completely uninformative list prices would have on professional real estate agents (who are considered experts in judging the value of homes). The findings indicated that the completely uninformative list price had a strong effect on lowest acceptable offer price, estimates of selling and purchase price, and estimates of value because of insufficient adjustments to the anchor. The agents, however, denied using list price in their price estimates. This finding is also consistent with Kahneman's (1992, p.308) discussion of "anchoring effects" which he describes as situations "in which a stimulus or a message that is clearly designated as irrelevant or uninformative nevertheless increases the normality of a possible outcome." Therefore, the anchoring and adjustment theory may serve as a meaningful basis for explaining how consumers may be positively influenced by implausible or exaggerated price claims.
Public Policy and Managerial Implications
As noted above, for implausible reference prices, "other" external prices had no effect on consumers' value perceptions or search intentions. In fact, even highly implausible prices significantly reduced consumers' search intentions, and we believe these results indicate that use of fictitious reference prices remains a concern for consumer welfare and public policy. These findings were evident for a product that almost all respondents owned and were likely to have been reasonably aware of marketplace prices. For products such as jewelry and furniture (which are infrequently purchased and for which quality may be difficult to evaluate), this problem may be magnified, and future research for such categories seems warranted.
In our opinion, these effects on perceived value and search intentions of the highly implausible reference price are of public policy concern because they suggest that such prices are capable of misleading consumers about the value of the product offer and they may be considered material because they potentially affect consumer marketplace search. In addition, reference prices in ads are very difficult for consumers to verify easily. The fact that both the implausible and highly implausible prices had effects in our study, coupled with effects of exaggerated prices in other studies and samples, suggest that these effects are not isolated and can occur for reasonable consumers. We view these effects as quite consistent with anchoring and adjustment, a theory that has been shown to have broad application and effects even when decision-makers are very knowledgeable (e.g., Northcraft and Neale 1987) .
Although the FTC has chosen not to make reference price ads a priority recently, these ads have been of interest at the state level (e.g., New York vs. Roebuck & Co. 1989, Colorado vs. May Department Stores Co. 1990 and North Carolina vs. J.C. Penny Co., Inc. 1989) and in other countries (e.g., Canada). We generally agree with many policy-makers and researchers that comparative price and other types of ads, when used truthfully, provide useful information to consumers (e.g, Ippolito 1986; Ippolito and Mathios 1991) . Thus, we do not support a blanket ban of reference price ads simply due to the possibility of abuse by retail merchants. However, given our results for implausible and highly implausible reference prices, we believe that policymakers at either the state or federal level should monitor reference prices used in advertising (cf. Blair and Landon 1981; Compeau and Grewal 1998) .
Results also suggest that when the reference prices are plausible in certain situations consumers are likely to use relevant, non-target price information to evaluate a reference price ad. From a managerial perspective, this suggests that merchants that advertise only a sale price or use a low-plausible reference price may not be as much at a disadvantageous position as previous studies have indicated. However, merchants choosing to advertise only the sale price or a low-plausible reference price should carefully monitor competitors' prices to ensure that those prices are not too close to the merchant's offer price. If the competitors' prices are close to the merchant's sale price, the merchant may benefit by advertising a high-plausible but legally defensible reference price.
Limitations and Future Research
The findings of this research should be viewed as the first step in the evaluation of the effects of "other" external price information on consumers' processing of reference prices in advertisements. Clearly, the two studies have some limitations. First, the studies were conducted with only one product and in a laboratory setting with students. Therefore, additional studies should be conducted with other products and diverse population groups to generalize the effects found in our studies. Second, we used unknown brands and did not identify store names, so future studies can examine the role that brand and store names may play in evaluations of "other" price information. Third, the dependent variables were restricted to perceived value of the deal, attitude towards the deal and search intentions. Future studies should include behavioral intentions as a dependent variable and examine the precise process through which consumers' internal reference prices are affected by "other" price information. Fourth, the studies compared only a single level of "other" price information against a control group with no other price data.
Future studies should examine the effects of various levels or different types of "other" price information. Finally, it would be interesting to assess if implausible reference prices lead consumers to believe that the advertised product is of superior quality. The possibility that implausible reference prices could influence quality judgment, and consequently evaluation of value, underscores the possible deceptive effects of exaggerated reference prices and should be of significant public policy concern. 
